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Abstract We extend the economic analysis of negligence and intervening causation to "two-sided causation" scenarios. In the two-sided causation scenario the
effectiveness of the injurer's care depends on some intervention, and the risk of
harm generated by the injurer's failure to take care depends on some other intervention. We find that the distortion from socially optimal care is more severe in the
two-sided causation scenario than in the one-sided causation scenario, and generally
in the direction of excessive care. The practical lesson is that the likelihood that
injurers will have optimal care incentives under the negligence test in the presence
of intervening causal factors is low.
Keywords Negligence - Causation - Proximate cause - Intervening causal factor
Optimal care - Proportionate damages
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1 Introduction
Tort cases that examine causation have a common factual structure. First, the injurer
fails to take care. Second, some intervening act or omission occurs. The presence or
absence of the intervening act alters the risk associated with the injurer's failure to
take care. Third, the victim is injured.
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This paper presents a core model of the causation problem and uses it to explore
incentives for care in a rich set of causation scenarios. In the core model, the impact
of the injurer's care on the probability of an injury depends on an intervention that
determines whether care will be effective. Many negligence cases fall within this
model; perhaps the most famous is New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad.1 In
Grimstad the plaintiff's decedent, captain of a covered barge, drowned after falling
off the barge when it was bumped by a tugboat while lying in port. The captain's
wife, with him at the time of the accident, brought suit on the theory that the barge
owner was negligent in failing to install lifebuoys. If lifebuoys had been on the
barge, according to the wife, she would have been able to grab one and throw it in
time to save the captain. The appellate court held that although the barge owner was
negligent in failing to equip the barge with lifebuoys, there was no evidence that the
captain's wife would have been able to find a lifebuoy and throw it in time. Since
the captain's drowning probably would have occurred even if the barge had been
equipped with lifebuoys, the plaintiff lost her negligence lawsuit, on causation
grounds.
This one-sided intervening causation scenario, in which the defendant's care
depends on an intervention that determines whether care will be effective, is
common in the negligence cases, and has been examined from an economic
perspective in Shavell (1980), Landes and Posner (1983), Grady (1983), Kahan
(1989), Marks (1994), and Hylton and Lin (2013). The Shavell, Landes and Posner,
Grady, Kahan, and Marks papers assume that courts have full information. 2 Hylton
and Lin assume courts have limited information, in the sense of not knowing the
distribution of the probability of intervention.
If courts have full information, injurers will exercise optimal care under the
negligence test in the presence of intervening causation; assuming no judicial error
(Grady 1983; Kahan 1989).3 If, on the contrary, courts have limited information,
injurers may not exercise optimal care. Since the limited information setting is
likely to be common (or at least not uncommon), the interesting question is finding
the direction and magnitude of the distortion from optimal care, under conditions
that reflect the actual decision processes of courts in causation cases.
The problem of limited information in causation analysis was first addressed by
Calabresi (1975), who suggested that courts, constrained by lack of information and
by evidence norms, essentially perform an ex post evaluation of negligence in
264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920).
2 Although Grady, Kahan, and Marks assume courts have full information, in the sense of being able to
determine the optimal standard or level, they do allow for courts to make mistakes in determining whether
the injurer complied with the standard.
3 If there is a risk of judicial error in applying the negligence test, then actors may take too much care in
the full information model if courts do not apply the negligence test accurately; but if courts apply the test
correctly, care incentives will be optimal. For a recent survey, see Grady (2013). To clarify the GradyKahan analysis, it may be useful to consider an example from Kahan's article. Suppose a cricket ball is hit
over a fence whose height was set unreasonably low, and injures a person, who then sues the owner of the
cricket grounds. If the ball would have sailed over a fence set at a reasonable height, then a court would
find against the plaintiff on causation grounds. However, it is easy to see in this example how error in
application of the negligence test might arise. For example, one source of error is the difficulty in
determining precisely whether in fact the cricket ball would have cleared a fence set at reasonable height.

Springer

Eur J Law Econ (2015) 40:393-411

395

intervening causation cases, using information revealed by the accident. 4 We
examine the distortive potential-that is, the extent to which care deviates from the
socially optimal level-of the ex post negligence assessment here.
More specifically, we extend the one-sided causation analysis of Hylton and Lin
(2013) to the two-sided causation scenario. In the two-sided causation scenario the
effectiveness of the injurer's care depends on some intervention, as in Grimstad.
However, in addition, the risk of harm generated by the injurer's failure to take care
depends on some other intervention. Like the one-sided causation scenario, the twosided causation scenario is common in the negligence case law. One Posner opinion
widely cited for its description of the negligence test, McCarty v. Pheasant Run,5
examines such a scenario.
The two-sided causation scenario presents a potentially interesting problem for
several reasons. First, from the perspective of tort doctrine, the possibility of
intervention altering the effectiveness of the injurer's care is treated as a "factual
causation" issue, and the possibility of intervention altering the risk associated with
the injurer's failure to take care is discussed as a "proximate causation" issue. This
model examines the incentive effects of tort law in the presence of combined factual
and proximate causation issues. Second, although care is generally distorted from
optimality in the one-sided causation scenario, an optimal care outcome still
remains possible, and is plausible in that scenario for many negligence settings. 6
The question this raises is whether optimal care is still a plausible outcome in the
two-sided scenario.
To elaborate, given the distortion of care from optimality in the one-sided
causation scenario, is the distortion compounded in the two-sided causation
scenario, as seems likely, and how bad is the resulting distortion? Does the
distortion suggest that optimal or inadequate care outcomes are unlikely? These
questions are addressed here.
We develop a measure of the extent to which care is distorted from the optimal
level under the negligence test in the presence of intervening causal factors. We find
that in the two-sided causation scenario, the distortions from optimal care are
considerably more severe than in the one-sided scenario. The direction of the
distortion depends on the distributions of both of the relevant intervention
probabilities. Using simulations incorporating assumptions we consider representative of negligence cases, we find that the general distortion is toward excessive
care. More importantly, the simulations suggest that the compounding of distortions
is so great that both the optimal care and the inadequate care outcomes are unlikely
in the two-sided scenario.
In our simulations, we use the Beta distribution for the intervention probabilities
because it permits us to simulate a wide range of probability distributions for the
intervention probabilities-from symmetrical to strongly skewed. The different
parameters of the model permit us to simulate a wide event space of outcomes under
the negligence test. We find that the parameter assumptions (specifically, regarding

4

On the ex post nature of causation analysis, see also Wright (1985), Landes and Posner (1987).

5

826 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1987).

6 Hylton and Lin (2013).
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the productivity of precaution) required to generate optimal or inadequate care
outcomes in the two-sided causation scenario are so narrow that these outcomes
appear to be implausible. We also find that there is a possible solution: under a
proportionate damages measure, as suggested in Shavell (1985), the optimal care
outcome is considerably more plausible.7
The practical lesson of this paper is that the likelihood that injurers will have
optimal care incentives under the negligence test in the presence of intervening
causal factors affecting both care and risk appears to be low. The model developed
here provides a more fine-grained analysis of the relationship between causation and
the incentive for care than under standard models that assume full information
courts.8 The model could be applied to analyze incentives in real world settings in
which probability distributions can be assigned to causal interventions. Moreover,
the model could be applied to more general settings in law enforcement where
causation issues arise.
Part II presents several examples of causation scenarios reflected in the negligence
case law, and uses a numerical example to illustrate our core argument. Part III
presents the model and our method of measuring the distortion from optimal care.
Part III also presents conditions under which care is optimal, excessive, or inadequate
under the negligence test, and simulations of the model. Part IV concludes.

2 Two-sided causation scenarios: examples
Given the ubiquity of intervening causal factors, every negligence dispute could be
viewed as a two-sided causation case, depending on the granularity with which one
identifies intervening factors. Even in the simple automobile accident, the effectiveness of care in maintaining, say, a braking system depends on the attentiveness of the
driver (an intervening factor on the care side), and the dangerousness of failing to take
care depends on the presence of potential victims (an intervening factor on the harm
side).
But courts do not view every negligence case as a two-sided causation problem.
The causation question arises only in cases where the facts raise a substantial
question whether the actor should be considered negligent in light of the low
probability of a particular intervention occurring. Here are some examples that
illustrate the sorts of cases in which the causation problem attracts attention.
2.1 Boat Safety Scenario
The first two-sided causation scenario we consider is a straightforward extension of
the Grimstad facts. Recall that in Grimstad, the captain fell overboard after his
7

To be precise, we find that the optimal care outcome is possible irrespective of the assumed value of
productivity of care.
8 One can view the full information model as a special case of the limited information
model.
intermediate case, which we do not consider here, would have the court knowing the distribution of
intervention probability for only one of two intervening factors. The approach used in this paper
measuring distortion from optimal care could be applied to intermediate versions.
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barge was bumped by a tugboat while it was anchored in port. The bump is itself an
intervention that dramatically increased the risk of an injury.
In this new scenario there are two potential interventions that affect the
productivity of taking care (i.e., installing lifebuoys). One intervention is on the care
side: care is ineffective unless someone can get to a lifebuoy in time to save the
drowning victim. The other intervention is on the risk side: failing to take care
(failing to install lifebuoys) does not increase the risk of injury unless a tugboat
bumps the barge.
To get a sense of the influence of causation assessments, consider the following
illustration. The barge owner, who has decided not to install lifebuoys, knows how
often the captain is likely to be alone (or with only his wife) instead of surrounded
by experienced sailors. Also, the barge owner knows how likely it is that the barge
will be bumped by a tugboat while lying in port.
The probability of intervention on the care side is the probability that a certain
type of rescuer will be available (on one extreme, an experienced sailor, or, on the
other extreme, the captain's wife). The expected probability of care side
intervention averages over the rescuer types. After the accident occurs, the court
sees the specific rescuer and forms an estimate of the intervention probability for the
event that materialized. Similarly, the expected probability of intervention, on the
risk side, averages over the times when a tug is likely to bump the barge and the
times when a tug is unlikely to do so. These events depend on the density of tugboat
traffic. The expected probability of risk-side intervention averages over the relevant
traffic densities.
Assume two probabilities of care side intervention, 14 and 34. The low probability
corresponds to the instances in which the captain is on the barge with only his wife
while the high probability corresponds to instances in which the captain is with
other experienced sailors. The low-intervention probability scenario occurs with
frequency 14 and the high-intervention probability scenario occurs with frequency
34.

Thus, the expected probability of care side intervention is

(/4)(/4)

= 5/8. The frequencies of the high-intervention and low-intervention
probability scenarios are known to the barge owner but not to the court.
Similarly, let there be two probabilities of risk-side intervention, 14 and 34, where
the low probability reflects the likelihood of a bump from a tug in low density
periods (only one tug is present) and the high probability is the likelihood of a bump
in high density periods (two tugs are present). Let the corresponding traffic density
frequencies be 14 and 34. These probabilities are known to the barge owner but not
to the court.
Finally, let the probability of an injury be 34 if the barge owner fails to install
lifebuoys, and 14 if the barge owner installs lifebuoys and the lifebuoys are
effectively deployed. The cost of installing lifebuoys is $1500, and the injury
resulting from the captain's drowning is $10,000.
Under the standard "Hand Formula" approach, the barge owner should install
lifebuoys if the cost of taking care is less than the expected loss avoided. To fail to
do so under these conditions would constitute negligence. The expected loss
avoided is simply the differential in injury probabilities multiplied by the average
probabilities of intervention (on both the care side and the risk side):
(34)(34)
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(5/8)(5/8)(3/4 _ 1/4)($10, 000)

$1953.12

Since the cost of installing lifebuoys, $1500, is less than $1953.12, the barge owner
is negligent in failing to do so.
After the accident occurs, and the lawsuit filed, the court reviews the accident
evidence, and determines negligence based on actual (or realized) intervention
probabilities. 9 Suppose the accident occurs in the low density period (only one tug is
present) and when the captain is on the barge with only his wife. Based on the
observed evidence, the expected loss avoided by installing lifebuoys is

(1/4)(1/4)(3/4- 1/4)($10,000)

$312.50

and since this is less than the cost of installing lifebuoys, the court concludes that the
barge owner was not negligent.
The key behind the court's conclusion, legally valid and economically erroneous,
is its ex post assessment of causal factors. On the care side, the court concludes that
the likelihood of intervention preventing an injury (deployment of lifebuoys) is too
low to have made a difference. On the risk side, the court concludes that the
likelihood of an intervention leading to an injury (a bump by a tugboat) is too low,
given the observed traffic density, to require heightened precaution.
2.2 Safe Lock Scenario I
Another two-sided causation scenario involves the decision to lock something that
might be valuable to keep it out of the hands of thieves. Suppose, for example, a
hotel or jewelry store has a choice whether to purchase a safe in which to store
valuable items. For the safe to be effective against thieves, however, someone
tending the safe has to lock it. In Wallinga v. Johnson,1 the plaintiff left jewelry to
be kept in a hotel safe, but the hotel employees failed to lock the safe. Thieves
robbed the hotel and took the jewelry.
However, failing to lock a safe does not create a risk if thieves never attempt to
steal. Thus, in this scenario there are two types of intervention that affect the
productivity of taking care (installing a safe): intervention on the care side (locking
the safe), and intervention on the harm side (by thieves).
2.3 Safe Lock Scenario II
In the previous scenarios the risk of an intervention leading to injury was assumed
not to depend on whether the actor took care. In Boat Safety Scenario, for example,

9

Unless the barge owner voluntarily reveals the expected intervention probabilities, the court has no way
of determining them. And from the court's perspective any testimony on these probabilities would be
regarded as conjectural and speculative, since it cannot be tested and verified. The observed intervention
probabilities, however, are verifiable and therefore acceptable as a basis for determining negligence.
Courts are required to use verifiable rather than speculative or conjectural evidence. This is a fundamental
rule in many provisions of state and federal evidence law, and in civil jury instructions. See e.g.,
Vermont's general jury instructions, at http://www.vtbar.org/UserFiles/Files/WebPages/Attorney%
20Resources/juryinstructions/civiljuryinstructions/generaljury.htm.
10 131 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 1964).
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the probability of a boat bumping the barge does not depend on whether the barge
installed lifebuoys. In Safe Lock Scenario I, the probability that thieves would
attempt to steal does not depend on whether a safe was present.
In many instances, taking care does affect the probability that a third party will
intervene. Consider the risk of a car theft as a function of the safety measures taken
by the car owner. If the owner is careless, and leaves his keys in a visible place in
the car, then an intervening actor (thief) may open the car and drive off with it. On
the other hand, if the owner is careful, taking his keys and locking his car door, it is
still possible that a thief will steal the car. But the probability of car theft is clearly
higher when the owner leaves the keys in the car. In Ross v. Hartman,11 a thief,
spotting the key in the ignition, stole the defendant's car and negligently ran over
the plaintiff. The court found that the thief's conduct was proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence.
In Strong v. Granite FurnitureCo.,' 2 the defendant's negligent failure to lock the
window of the plaintiff's house allowed a burglar to enter. The court held that the
burglar's damage was not proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. Leaving
the windows open makes it easy for a burglar to enter. However, locking the windows
does not foreclose the possibility of a burglary; it only reduces the probability.
There is only one intervening act (theft) in the two examples just considered (Ross
and Strong). Still, these are cases of two-sided causation, because the probability of
third party intervention depends on whether the initial actor takes care.
It is easy to modify the previous scenarios (Boat Safety, Safe Lock I) to allow for
the kind of interdependency observed here. In Safe Lock I, for the safe to be
effective, the person tending the safe must remember to lock it. However, thieves
might be less likely to attempt to steal when they are aware that a safe is present.
The thieves might assume that the safe is locked, and decide to find some other hotel
(diversion effect) where the owners do not use safes.s

3 Model
We start with a presentation of the standard one-sided causation scenario, and then
move on to two-sided scenarios. First, we lay out the basic model and then develop
a measure of the distortion from optimal care.
3.1 One-sided causation
3.1.1 Core model
Taking care affects the probability of an accident, but the effect is conditional on an
intervention. Let r = the probability of an injury given that the injurer does not take
care. Let s = the probability of an intervention that makes care effective, w = the
"
12

138 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
294 P. 303 (Utah 1930).

13 On the diversion effect of precaution against theft, see Baumann and Friehe (2013).
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Fig. 1 Causation event diagram
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probability of an injury if the intervention occurs, w < r. Let x = the cost of taking
care, and let L = the loss suffered by the accident victim. Moreover, we assume
x < (r - w)L.
The causation problem described is captured in the following tree diagram (Fig. 1).
Before the injurer chooses how much care to take, the probability of intervention
is unknown; only its distribution is known by the injurer. After the injurer invests in
care, the actual intervention probability so is revealed and an accident occurs. The
injurer's care decision is a durable type of precaution that affects the probability of
an accident once the intervention probability is realized later. The court cannot
observe the distribution of the intervention probability, but the court does observe
the actual intervention probability so when it determines liability.
Let the intervention probability be governed by the distribution G(s) with
corresponding density g(s). Taking care is socially desirable if the expected social
cost when the injurer takes care is less than the expected social cost when the injurer

f=

does not take care, x< (r - w)E(s)L, where E(s)
sg(s)ds is the expected value
of the intervention probability.
However, since the court has limited information it cannot apply the optimal care
standard, x < (r - w)E(s)L, to determine negligence. Specifically, the court does
not know G(s) and therefore cannot determine E(s).
In view of the court's limited information, we model the negligence determination in the presence of an intervening causal factor as an ex post assessment-an
assessment based on the observation of the actual intervention probability. 14 There
are two justifications for this approach.
First, this is what courts have done in the causation cases. The court's finding
against causation in Grimstad was based on its ex post observation of the actual
intervention probability, which was determined by the fact that the captain's wife
was the only person on the barge at the time of the accident. The ex post assessment
method is common in the causation cases.
14 The notion that negligence is determined ex post, using information revealed by the accident, is noted
in Calabresi (1975) and assumed in the early formalization of Landes and Posner (1983). The ex ante
versus ex post problem is discussed briefly in Landes and Posner (1987, at 235), though informally and
only in response to criticisms of their work.
15 Consider a few examples. In Gyerman v. United States Lines, 7 Cal. 3d 488, 498 P.2d 1043,
102 Cal.

Rptr. 795 (1972), the defendant charged the plaintiff with contributory negligence for failing to inform his
supervisor of a dangerous condition in the workplace. The evidence suggested that the accident probably
would have happened even if the plaintiff had informed the supervisor. The court concluded that the
defendant failed to show that the plaintiffs negligence was a substantial factor causing the injury. In
Rouleau v. Butler, 152 Atl. 916 (N.H. 1931), involving an accident between the defendant's truck and the
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Second, the ex post approach is more or less required by established evidence and
procedure constraints. Courts are required to use verifiable rather than speculative or
conjectural evidence. The observed intervention probability is verifiable, while the
distribution of the intervention probability is a matter of speculation and conjecture
for the (limited-information) court. Moreover, testimony from the informationallyadvantaged defendant on the distribution of the intervention probability would also
be non-verifiable, as well as biased by self-interest.
Under the ex post assessment of negligence, the injurer will be held liable if he
fails to take care and, under the particular realization of the intervention probability,
say so, care would have been socially beneficial, x < (r - w)soL, or x/(r - w)
L < so. It follows that the injurer takes care under the negligence test when
x<
x<I I

-L

)L-1

(1>

rL.

Hylton and Lin (2013) prove that in the one-sided intervening causation scenario,
the negligence test leads to socially excessive care if (r - w)E(s) < r[1 - G(E(s))],
socially optimal care if equality holds, and socially inadequate if the inequality is
reversed. The left-hand side of this inequality, (r - w)E(s), is the marginal social
benefit of care (per dollar of loss L). The right-hand side, r[1 - G(E(s))], is the
marginal private benefit of care evaluated at the efficiency cut-off (x = (r - w)
E(s)L). Thus, if the marginal private benefit of care, at the efficiency cut-off,
exceeds the marginal social benefit of care, the incentive for care will be excessive.
Our approach to measuring the incentive distortion is to examine the wedge
between the marginal social benefit of care and the marginal private benefit of care at
the efficiency cut-off. That measure is equal to: L{(r - w)E(s) - r[1 - G(E(s))]},
which is negative in the case of a distortion toward excessive care and positive in the
case of a distortion toward inadequate care. Letting D represent the distortion,
(1 - G(E(s)))
E(s)
where p = (r - w)/r, and measures the productivity of care. [6
For comparison purposes we consider examples in which we calculate the
relative size of the incentive distortion for a fixed value of the loss L. For these
comparisons it is sufficient to look only at D.
For example, if the intervention probability follows the Exponential distribution,
Footnote 15 continued
plaintiff, the defendant failed to signal his turn, but the plaintiffs driver was not looking for the signal
over most of the time in which it might have made a difference. In Weeks v. McNulty, 48 S.W. 809
(Tenn. 1898), the court found that a hotel was negligent for failing to install a fire escape, but there was
insufficient evidence to indicate that the plaintiffs decedent would have used a fire escape.

16 Under a proportional damages measure (r - w)L/r, this distortion measure simplifies to a term
proportional to E(s) - (1 - G(E(s))), which is equal to zero for a symmetric distribution. However, for
non-symmetric G, the distortion problem remains. Shavell (1985) proposes a proportional damages
measure for causation cases. The proportional damages award also represents the setting where
counterfactual damages are subtracted. Thus, subtracting counterfactual damages would not be sufficient
to generate optimal care.
I
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As p goes from zero to one, care becomes more productive. The distribution
parameter ) is equal to the expected value of the intervention probability. The
optimal care curve consists of the parameter values (p, 2) for which the distortion
measure D = 0, which traces out a rectangular hyperbola.
3.1.2 Simulation

1:

Beta distribution

We allow for the intervention probability (signal) to have a Beta distribution. The
advantage of the Beta is that it permits us to examine the incentives for care as the
signal distribution changes from symmetrical to skew.
Figure 2 shows the value of D as a function of the mean of the signal distribution
(a/(oa + f3)). We used different values for the productivity of care p, shown in the
box in Fig. 2. The distortion curve shifts up as the productivity of care increases.
The dashed curve is associated with a value of p of 2/3. The dotted curve is
associated with a p value of .89. The diamond-dotted curve is associated with a p
value of roughly .95. The solid black curve is associated with a p value of .5.1
As we increase the mean of the Beta-distributed signal, we move from a signal
distribution that is skewed left to one that is skewed right. The symmetrical
distribution is represented by the midpoint along the horizontal axis, where a/
(a + 3) = .5.
In plotting the curves shown in Fig. 2, we assumed a + 3 = 20. In order to
change the degree of skewness of the distribution, we moved the parameters, in onedigit increments, from the combination {a = 1, p = 19} to the combination
{a = 19, p = 1}, and plotted the distortion measure for each of the corresponding
values of a/(a + 3). In other words, the values of a/(a + 3) begin at 1/20 and run
up to 19/20.
Where the distortion variable is negative, the actor takes excessive care.
Inadequate care is associated with positive distortion values. Optimal care is
observed where the distortion value is equal to zero.
Figure 2 indicates a tendency toward excessive care under the negligence test.
For most of the distribution patterns simulated the distortion measure is negative.
This is somewhat counterintuitive if ones' first inclination is to think that the
causation requirement reduces the scope of liability, and should therefore result in a
weaker incentive for care.
The three highest curves in Fig. 2 cross the zero distortion line, which means that
there exists a set of Beta distribution parameter values, under the three highest
17

We used 9p = (2/3 - 1/3)/(2/3) = .5 for the solid black curve.
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Fig. 2 Distortion from optimal care, Beta distribution case

assumed productivity of care levels (p = .67, p = .89, and p = .95), for which
care is socially optimal. The dashed curve, which graphs distortion levels for
9 = .67, crosses the zero distortion line (optimal care) when the signal mean value
(a/(o + 3)) is roughly equal to .85. The dotted curve (p = .89) crosses the zero line
when the signal mean is .6. The diamond-dotted curve (p = .95) crosses the zero
line when the signal mean is .55. The solid black curve (p = .5) does not cross the
zero distortion line.
This simulation implies that in order to have an outcome in which care is socially
optimal, rather than excessive, both the productivity of care and the signal mean
have to have relatively high values. Specifically, for optimal care to be observed
under the negligence test, the degree of the productivity of care must be above a
certain threshold (specifically, p > .65)18 and the signal distribution must be
sufficiently skewed to the right.
3.2 Two-sided causation
Here we model two-sided causation scenarios-again in the presence of limitedinformation courts. After examining some two-sided causation models, which are
by no means exhaustive of the types of cases in which the two-sided causation
problem might arise, we examine simulations. We compare the results of the onesided model simulations to those of the two-sided model simulations in order to
18 We ran several simulations for different values of the productivity of care
((p), and found that the
productivity value must be greater than or equal to .65 in order to observe an outcome in which care is
optimal (D = 0).
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determine whether the degree of distortion from optimal care is greater in the twosided scenario. We find that the distortion is greater.
3.2.1 Independent interventions

The first set of two-sided causation scenarios we consider involves independent
interventions-that is, scenarios where intervention on the care side is independent
of the probability of intervention on the risk side. For ease of comparison with
previous results, we start with an extension of the Boat Safety Scenario examined in
the preceding section of this paper.
3.2.1.1 Boat Safety Scenario Continuing with the scenario based on Grimstad,
suppose the risk of injury depends on the conduct of an intervening actor.
Specifically, suppose that the risk of drowning increases substantially only if the
captain's barge is bumped by a tugboat.
Let q = the probability that an intervening injurer appears (e.g., the barge is
bumped by a tug). We will assume that q is a random variable, like the other
intervention probability s, and that it is independent of s. The probability of injury if
the initial actor does not take care is therefore E(q)r + (1 - E(q))w. Taking care
(installing lifebuoys) is socially desirable if
x+ E(q)[E(s)w + (1-E(s))r]L+ [1-E(q)]wL<E(q)rL+ (1-E(q))wL
which is equivalent to
x<E(q)E(s)(r- w)L.

(3)

Constrained by lack of information and by evidence rules, the court uses its
observations of the intervention probabilities so and qo to determine negligence. It
follows that the injurer will be found negligent under the ex post evaluation of
negligence if
x

4

(r - w)L <soqo

Thus, if z = sq, and H(z) is the cumulative distribution function, the barge owner
will take care under negligence when
x<

1-H(

(x)L)

rL,

(5)

which is equivalent to the one-sided causation scenario except for the form of the
distribution function.
3.2.1.2 Safe Lock Scenario Another two-sided causation scenario similar to the
one just studied involves the locking of a safe or some durable precaution designed
to prevent an injury. The obvious example is where a hotel purchases a safe for the
storage of valuables. The safe is effective, however, only if the hotel employees
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remember to lock it. In addition, nothing will happen unless thieves attempt to steal
valuables from the hotel.
An alternative version of the same scenario: a railroad is transporting a dangerous
chemical through a populated area. For example, in Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana
Bridge & R.R.19 a tank car containing gasoline derailed as a result of the defendant
railroad's negligence, causing gasoline to spill. The intervening actor threw a
lighted match onto the gasoline, causing an explosion that injured the plaintiff. The
question was whether the intervening act was foreseeable. Obviously, there are
many variations one could offer based on this example.
As a general matter, the railroad must decide whether to purchase a special lock
for the release valve on the tank car holding the dangerous chemical. If it purchases
the lock, someone must remember to actually lock the valve. In general, however,
the risk of spillage is low unless an intervening actor deliberately opens the valve to
release the chemical.
In this class of scenarios the effectiveness of taking care, by purchasing a
lockable barrier, depends on whether the actor takes the intervening step of
engaging the lock. On the other hand, the risk of an injury is minimal unless the
intervening actor attempts to breach the barrier.
Let s = the probability that the actor engages the lock, and q = the probability
that the intervening actor attempts to breach the barrier. I assume, as in the previous
part, that the probability of attempting to breach the barrier is not dependent on the
likelihood of a barrier existing.
Taking care is socially desirable in the Safe Lock Scenario if
x

+ E(s)wL + (1-E(s))[E(q)r+ (1-E(q))w]L<E(q)rL + (1-E(q))wL

which simplifies to x < E(q)E(s)(r - w)L. Since this is the same as (3), the actual
determination of the care level is governed by (5).
3.2.1.3 Optimality of care and distortion measure, independent interventions

The

foregoing examples suggest that, as a general matter, the care determination in
independent interventions scenarios can be described by (5). This, in turn, implies
the following:
Proposition 1

In the two-sided intervening causation scenario with independent

interventions, the negligence test leads to socially excessive care if (r - w)
E(s)E(q) < r[1 - H(E(s)E(q))]. Care is socially optimal if equality holds and
socially inadequate if the inequality is reversed.

The incentive distortion measure for the independent interventions scenario is

(1 - H(E(s)E(q))
E(s)E(q)
D < 0 implies that the negligence test induces socially excessive care. D = 0 is
associated with optimal care, and D > 0 is associated with inadequate care.

19 126

S.W.

146 (Ky. 1910).

I

Springer

Eur J Law Econ (2015) 40:393-411

406

3.2.2 Simulation 3: two-sided causation, Beta distribution case

Now we simulate incentives for care for the independent interventions, two-sided
causation scenarios examined previously (Boat Safety, Safe Lock).
The interesting question is whether the distortion from socially optimal care is
greater in the two-sided causation scenario than in the one-sided scenario. Since the
answer to this question depends on assumptions with respect to the productivity of
care ((p) and the distributions of the intervention probabilities, we use simulations to
examine the distortion from optimal care.
Following the same approach as in Fig. 2, we allowed for the signals q and s to
have Beta distributions where s is distributed BetajQt, 3) and q is distributed
Beta q(y, 6). The x axis in Fig. 3 measures the product of the two mean signal values.
The parameters for each of the distributions sum to 20 (i.e., a + 3 = 20,
y + 6 = 20).
In carrying out the simulation, we fixed the degree of skewness on the
s distribution and allowed the other to move from left skew to right skew. This
allows us to replicate the simulation approach taken with the one-signal case
examined earlier in Fig. 2.
Specifically, the dark line fixes the distribution of s at the symmetric position and
permits the distribution of q to run from a strong left skew to a strong right skew. As
the skew moves from left to right, the value on the horizontal axis, (a/
(a + 3)) x (y/(y + 6)), moves from left to right. We repeated the same exercise
with different assumptions on a and p shown below.
As Fig. 3 shows, the distortion levels in the two-sided causation scenario are
greater than in the one-sided causation scenario simulated in Fig. 2. Moreover, in

fir

............ ................

0
-101-20
t

o-30

Z-

-40
t

I

-600

r

a=R= 10

I

-60 I

=15

I
-70 I
I
I

0

a=15,,R=5
a=19,,R=1

'

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

(W(+p))*(y/(y+b)) (product of mean signal values)
Fig. 3 Distortion from optimal care, two-sided causation, Beta distribution case (assuming qp

Springer

.95)

Eur J Law Econ (2015) 40:393-411

407

order to find a set of parameter values which generated socially optimal care taking,
we had to set the productivity of care at the highest level ((p = (.95 - .05)/
.95 , .95). For care productivity levels cp = .66 and cp = .89, care is socially
excessive for all of the Beta parameter combinations tested.
The dotted curve in Fig. 3 is the only one that crosses the zero distortion line and
that crossing occurs where the value on the horizontal axis is .87. The dotted curve
represents the most extreme right skew combination that we could implement in this
simulation. For the dotted curve, s is distributed Betas(19,1) and q is permitted to
move from a strong left skew (Betaq(1, 19)) to a strong right skew ((Betaq(19,l)).
Yet, even in this case, negative distortion values-signaling socially excessive
care-are observed for all but two of the parameter combinations used for the
q distribution. These results suggest that the optimal care outcome is unlikely to be
observed in the two-sided causation scenario.
3.3 Interdependent interventions
We extend the analysis here to two-sided causation scenarios where intervention on the
risk side depends on intervention on the care side. Although we provide no simulations,
the distortion from optimality observed earlier in the independent interventions
scenarios appears to be even greater in the interdependent interventions scenarios.
3.3.1 Safe Lock Scenario II

The probability that an intervening criminal actor strikes depends on whether the
initial actor takes care. For example, the initial actor decides whether to leave his keys
in the car, and the intervening actor decides whether to attempt to steal the car. If the
intervening actor sees that the keys are inside the car, he is more likely to steal the car.
Care is socially desirable if
x

+ E(s)rL + (1-E(s))wL<E(q)rL + (1-E(q))wL.

(7)

In this condition, the left-hand side represents the social cost when the initial
actor (car owner) chooses to take care. Society bears the cost of taking care plus the
expected cost of a car theft, given the car owner's decision to take care. The
expected probability that the thief will intervene when the car owner takes care is
E(s). The right-hand side shows the cost to society when the car owner does not take
care, in which case the expected intervention probability is E(q). Condition (7) is
equivalent to
x< [E(q)-E(s)](r-w)L.

(8)

A limited-information court will hold the actor liable under the negligence test if

x< (qo- so)(r - w)L.

(9)

This case is interesting because it indicates that taking care is never socially
desirable in this scenario when E(s) > E(q). It follows that if the intervention
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probabilities, q and s, are both from a symmetric distribution, taking care is never
socially desirable. These implications are economically reasonable because if the
expected intervention probability is higher when the car owner takes care, then
taking care is a waste of resources.
The interesting feature of this intervening causation scenario is that the car owner
may have an incentive to take care, given the structure of the negligence test, even
when taking care could not possibly be socially desirable. The incentive distortion
created by the negligence test is at least as severe in this scenario as in the preceding
causation scenarios examined.
Substituting v = 1 - s allows us to express (9) as the sum of two random
variables, v + q. Using this, taking care is socially desirable if
x< [E(q) + E(v) -1](r-w)L
Letting H(z) represent the distribution function for the sum of random variables
z = q + v, we have the following result.
Proposition 2

In the interdependent interventions scenario, the negligence test

leads to socially excessive care if (r - w)(E(q) + E(v) - 1) < r[1 - H(E(q)
E(v))]. Care is socially optimal if equality holds and socially inadequate if the
inequality is reversed.

The case of symmetric distributions is easiest to examine. For the symmetric
case, E(q) = E(v) = 12, and H(E(q) + E(v)) = H(1). Since H(1) is the value of the
distribution function evaluated at its median, and the distribution of the sum of two
independent symmetric random variables is also symmetric, the median is the same
as the mean, which implies H(1) = 12. Given this, the condition in Proposition 2
reduces to 0 < r/2, where 0 is the marginal social value of care in this case. Thus, in
the symmetric distribution case, some actors will have incentives to take care even
under conditions in which care is never socially desirable, no matter how productive
care appears to be based on the differential r - w.
3.3.2 Non-exogenous intervention

There are still more variations on the two-sided causation scenarios examined here.
If the second actor (e.g., the thief) bases his decision, at least in part, on the initial
actor's (the owner's) probability of intervention, then the probability of the second
actor's intervention may be a function of the probability of the first actor's
intervention. Consider for example, the Safe Lock Scenario where the second
actor's probability of attempting to break the barrier (e.g., open the valve or open
the safe door) is a function of the first actor's probability of intervention (locking the
valve or safe door). If the second actor's intervention probability is simply a
function of the first actor's intervention probability, then the scenario is no longer
one of two-sided causation.
The models examined previously assume that the intervention probabilities are
exogenous. Of course there are settings, in addition to the case where the second
actor's intervention probability is dependent on the first actor's, where the
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exogeneity assumption would be inappropriate. Suppose, for example, that the first
actor can choose or constrain his probability of intervention. The precaution
decision involves investment in a durable precautionary measure and in constraining
the first actor's probability of intervention. To take a specific example, suppose the
first actor is the owner of a railroad tank car used to transport dangerous chemicals
and the second actor is a vandal. The owner decides how much to invest in a
lockable valve for the tank car, and how much to invest in monitoring employees to
induce them to consistently lock the valve, all while knowing how the second
actor's probability of intervention changes in response.
3.4 Solutions to the excessive care problem
One reform that would greatly reduce the tendency to excessive care revealed in
these models is for courts to follow the recommendation of Shavell (1985) by
awarding a proportionate damages measure pL = (r - w)L/r. Under proportionate
damages, the distortion measure for the one-sided causation scenario becomes
D = 1 - (1 - G(E(s))/E(s), which is equal to zero for any symmetrically
distributed intervention probability. Thus, whatever the value of the productivity
of care measure p (between the limits of zero and one), the zero distortion
(optimal care) outcome would be attainable. Similarly, for the two-sided
(independent interventions) scenario, the distortion measure would be D = 1
(1 - G(E(s)E(q))/E(s)E(q), with the same implication.

4 Conclusion
The early literature on causation demonstrates that if courts have full information,
incentives for care are optimal if the likelihood of judicial error is zero (Grady,
Kahan, Marks). The more realistic assumption, in our view, is that courts do not
have full information. In particular, courts do not always have full information on
the range and the probabilities of all of the intervening causal factors. We have
allowed for the court to be in a position of Knightian uncertainty, in the sense that it
does not know the distributions of the relevant intervention probabilities.2 0 The
innovation of this paper is its consideration of intervening causal factors affecting
both the impact of care and the impact of a failure to take care on the likelihood of
injury (two-sided causation).
Under the alternative informational assumptions here, incentives for care are not
necessarily optimal in the rich set of causation scenarios typically confronted by
courts. Our examination of one-sided and two-sided causation scenarios finds that
care incentives are often distorted from optimality, and that the two-sided causation
20 More generally, we can distinguish three types of causation case. In the first, courts have full
information, as in the case of car driven at a negligently fast speed, and the counterfactual events can be
calculated easily and with accuracy. In the second, the court can accurately determine optimal care, but
cannot determine easily determine whether the defendant complied with it as, for example, in the
cricket hypothetical of Kahan (1989). The third scenario, which is the focus here, is one of Knightian
uncertainty.
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scenarios compound distortions (generally in the direction of excessive care) to a
degree that suggests that the optimal care outcome is implausible. A proportionate
damages measure, as originally suggested in Shavell (1985), provides a potential
solution to this problem.

Appendix
Definition 1 The random variable X is said to have a Beta type I distribution with
parameters (a, b), a > 0, b > 0 denoted as X-BI (a, b), if its p.d.f. is given by
{B(a, b)}-

_ ,)b-1,

xa-1(1

0<x<1,

where, B(a, b) is the Beta function given by

B(a, b)

F(a)F(b){F(a+ b)}
(n - 1)!.

and the gamma function F(n)

Definition 2 The random variable X is said to have a hypergeometric function type
I distribution, denoted by X ~ H'(v, a, fl, y), if its p.d.f. is given by

F(y + v - I)F(7 + v - l)
F()F(v)F(7 + v where, 2F1 (a, b; c; z)

- fl)

1+

x -(1

Qb z +

-

x) -2F1(a,

l;7; 1 -

x),

(az(

)f

a(a 1)bb1) z2 + ...

0<x<1,

n-0

y+ v

-

a- /

>

0 and v > 0.

Definition 3

Let Xi and X 2 be independent, Xi ~ BI(ai, bi), i
b
X1X2 - H(ai, 2 , ai + bi - a2 , bi + b 2 ).
See Zarrazola and Nagar (2009).
1.

Single Signal Case (Beta Distribution)
a
E(s)=

G(E(s))

a+ b

I/Es)(a,

b)

xa-1(

_x)b-ldx

To compute the value, we used "betacdf" in Matlab.
D =(r - W) _ ( - G(E(s)))
\r
/
E(s)
where r, w are given.
2.

Two Signal Case (Beta Distribution)
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E(s)

a

a
, E(q)
a+b'

c

c

c+d

Based on the Definition 3 above, the product of independent Beta variables
follows XIX 2 ~ HI(a, d, a + b - c, b + d).
H(E(s)E(q))

J/

E(q)

F(b+d)F(a)F(c)
F(b + a)F(d + c) x-

(I-x)-2F1(d,a+b-c;a;I-x)dx

To compute the values for the simulation, we used "int" in Matlab and assuming
n = 3 in 2 F1 (a, b; c; 1 - x).
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